What Obama and the Democrats Knew That McCain Didn't

Had John McCain simultaneously chosen Condoleezza Rice as his Vice Presidential running mate (instead of Sarah Palin) and Mitt Romney as his Chief Economic Advisor coming out of the Convention, the Republicans could have actually won the 2008 Presidential Election; even in the aftermath of the Wall Street Economic Meltdown (based on an objective analysis of Presidential Exit Poll Data). This assertion is primarily based on three highly plausible suppositions that would have emerged, demographically, had Rice been chosen as the Republican Vice Presidential candidate, that could have decisively altered the outcome of the 2008 Presidential Election of Barack Obama.

In particular, Rice's presence on the Republican ticket would have cut across and appealed to several crucial demographic constituencies that no other Republican possibly could in 2008 (or, for that matter, in 2012 either). Moreover, the selection of Rice would have averted the devastatingly negative Voter impact of Sarah Palin's perceived lack of readiness to become President that endured through Election Day. Whereas, had Romney been "onboard" as an equal member of such a political triumvirate paradigm, the frantic and impulsive vacillations displayed by John McCain that excruciatingly transpired in the two weeks following the onset of the Wall Street Economic Meltdown in mid September 2008, need not ever have occurred.

Further, this book will examine how John McCain and the Republican Party, during the 2008 Presidential campaign, allowed themselves to be essentially handcuffed and effortlessly painted into a corner by Barack Obama and the Democrats on several major campaign issues for which justifiable, principled departures from rigid Republican Doctrine did, and still do, exist today.

Additionally, the personality traits of both McCain and Obama are analyzed as a basis for projecting their respective presidential crisis decision-making potential; based on observable behavior and reaction to events that occurred during the 2008 campaign. A similar analysis details how both McCain and Obama, at crucial times during the campaign, allowed their respective insecurities and/or petty vindictiveness to cloud and potential jeopardize even their most overriding, single-minded ambition: To be elected President.

The daunting (and maybe insurmountable) outlook confronting the Republican Party in 2012 and beyond will also be explored. Indeed, for the Republican Party, after 2020, the future looks even more bleak; at which time, if nothing materially changes, the Democrat Party will dominate the White House as the only remaining viable National Political Party.

As to the immediate future, a valid and objective Voter Expectation of the Republican Party is that their criticism of the Obama Democrat Administration will be accompanied by thoughtful, comprehensive alternative solutions. Moreover, it is axiomatic that Voters will, typically, not opt to "change horses in the middle of the stream" unless 1) the party in power seeking re-election is perceived not only as a troubled presidency (1980: Carter); but, as an additional prerequisite, 2) the opposition party a) has detailed alternative solutions and b) can articulate them (1980: Reagan).