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Omschrijving

Introduction Motivating Problems in Network Economics Mechanism Design Outline of the Monograph Foundations of Mechanism Design Strategic Form Games Dominant Strategy Equilibria Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Bayesian Games The Mechanism Design Environment Examples of Social Choice Functions Implementation of Social Choice Functions Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem Properties of Social Choice Functions The Gibbard Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem Arrow's Impossibility Theorem The Quasi Linear Environment Groves Mechanisms Clarke (Pivotal) Mechanisms Examples of VCG Mechanisms Bayesian Implementation: The dAGVA Mechanism Bayesian Incentive Compatibility in Linear Environment Revenue Equivalence Theorem Myerson Optimal Auction Further Topics in Mechanism Design To Probe Further Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions Internet Advertising Sponsored Search Auction Sponsored Search Auction as a Mechanism Design Problem Generalized First Price (GFP) Mechanism Generalized Second Price (GSP) Mechanism Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism Optimal (OPT) Mechanism Comparison of GSP, VCG, and OPT Mechanisms Individual Rationality Computational Complexity Summary and Future Work Related Literature Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing Grid Computing The Model The G-DSIC Mechanism The G-BIC Mechanism G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism Current Art and Future Perspective Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Introduction to Ad hoc Wireless Networks Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol DSIC-B Protocol versus BIC-B Protocol: A Discussion Conclusions and Future Work To Probe Further Topics in Mechanism Design Key Application Areas In Conclusion